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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
PlaintiffAppellee 
v. : 
ISAAC J. HOLLANDS : Case No. 990375-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, following a guilty plea, for one 
count of attempt to receive or transfer a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated sections 41-la-1316(2) (1998) and 76-4-101 (1995). This court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) which grants 
the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals from the district court for criminal 
convictions other than for a first degree or capital felony. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999) provides: 
A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Whether the trial judge abused her discretion in ordering Appellant's sentence to 
run consecutive to a sentence from a prior conviction without considering the ordinary 
nature of the offenses, Appellant's history of mainly minor, non-violent crimes, his 
repeated acceptance of responsibility, and his proven commitment to be rehabilitated. 
The standard for reviewing the sentencing decisions of the trial court is an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This issue is 
preserved at R. 52: 4-11.l See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state filed an Information on August 16, 1997, charging Appellant Isaac J. 
Hollands with one count each of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, failure to stop at the 
scene of an accident, and giving a false identity to a peace officer. R. 1-3. The district 
attorney and Mr. Hollands subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which Mr. 
Hollands agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempt to receive a stolen vehicle. R. 
25. In turn, the district attorney agreed to recommend to the sentencing judge that any 
prison sentence run concurrent to a sentence Mr. Hollands was already serving. R. 27B.2 
*The transcript of the sentencing hearing is contained in one volume marked nR. 52." 
The internal page numbers of that volume are listed after "R. 52." 
2The record contains two pages marked "27." For purposes of this brief, the second 
page marked 27 (page 4 of the plea agreement) will be referred to as fl27B." 
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On February 9, 1999, Mr. Hollands pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to 
receive stolen property. R. 25-27B. The trial judge sentenced Mr. Hollands on April 1, 
1999, to a term of zero to five years in the state prison and ordered it to run consecutive 
to Mr. Hollands' prior sentence. R. 37; 52: 10-11; Addendum B. Mr. Hollands filed a 
timely notice of appeal on April 27, 1999. R. 38. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 25, 1997, Mr. Hollands and a male companion sumamed "McCarty" were 
driving in West Valley City when another vehicle collided into them.3 R. 53: 2A.4 Mr. 
Hollands and Mr. McCarty fled on foot from the scene of the accident. Id When the 
police arrived, they found several citizens who were detaining Mr. Hollands and Mr. 
McCarty a few blocks away. Id. After investigating, the police learned that the car in 
which Mr. Hollands was traveling had been stolen from a car dealership two and-and-a-
half weeks previously. Id. The police also found on Mr. McCarty drug paraphernalia 
and methamphetamine. Id. 
3The district attorney conceded in the trial court that Mr. Hollands was not at fault for 
the traffic accident and, therefore, restitution was not warranted. R. 48. 
4The volume marked R. 53 contains a presentence report that was prepared for Mr. 
Hollands' prior conviction in Weber County and the addendum to that report that was 
prepared for the present matter. The pages to the addendum will be followed by an "A" 
while the pages to the presentence report will be followed by a f,B." The addendum does 
not include Mr. McCarty's first name. 
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Mr. Hollands was released on bail on August 19, 1997. R. 10-11. On October 21, 
1997, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer stopped Mr. Hollands for a traffic violation on 
Interstate 80 in Wyoming. R. 53: 2B. A vehicle records search revealed that the car was 
registered to Denise Warner and "Justin McCarti" of Midvale, Utah. Id. at 3B. During a 
pat down of Mr. Hollands and an inventory search of the car, the patrol officer found 
almost $4,000 in cash, a small container of amphetamine and numerous receipts for 
recently purchased items commonly used to produce methamphetamine. Id. at 2B-3B. 
The patrol officer found another receipt dated October 18, 1997, for the rental of a 
storage unit in Weber County, Utah. Id, A records check on Justin McCarti revealed 
that he had been arrested several times on drug-related charges and he was a suspect in 
numerous other drug offenses. Id, at 3B. 
After receiving this information, Ogden City police officers searched the storage 
unit and discovered a clandestine methamphetamine lab along with two weapons. Id. at 
4B. Although Mr. Hollands denied manufacturing methamphetamine, he admitted to 
police that he used a fictitious name to rent the unit for the operators of the drug lab. Id. 
at 4B-5B. His role in the lab was to procure the materials used to manufacture the drug. 
Id. Mr. Hollands conceded further that he became involved in the drug lab to obtain 
drugs for himself and to sell them to support his drug habit. Id. at 5B-6B. 
As part of a plea bargain, Mr. Hollands pleaded guilty in the Second Judicial 
District Court to one count each of attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab and 
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possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. R. 53: 5 A. On April 23, 1998, 
District Court Judge Michael D. Lyons sentenced Mr. Hollands to prison terms of one to 
15 years for the drug conviction and zero to five years for the weapon offense. Id. Judge 
Lyons ordered both terms to run concurrently. 
Following the disposition of the proceedings in Weber County, Mr. Hollands 
agreed to plead guilty in the present matter to one count of attempt to receive a stolen 
vehicle. R. 25. In return, the district attorney promised to recommend that any prison 
sentence run concurrently with Mr. Hollands' sentences previously imposed for the drug 
and weapon convictions. R. 27B. Mr. Hollands entered his guilty plea on February 9, 
1999. R. 25-27B. 
Mr. Hollands reported during the presentence investigation that he began using 
marijuana when he was 13 years old and continued to use it weekly until his arrest in 
Wyoming in 1997. R. 53: 18B. When he was 18, he started to use methamphetamine on 
a daily basis which also continued until he was incarcerated in Wyoming. Id, Despite 
his history of drug abuse, Mr. Hollands had never received substance abuse counseling. 
R. 53: 6A. 
Mr. Hollands admitted his drug dependency and resolved to stop using drugs and 
avoid people who use them. R. 53: 18B, 22B. To help him to reach these goals, Mr. 
Hollands committed to participate in drug and alcohol counseling and to graduate from 
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high school or obtain his GED certificate.5 Id, at 15B, 17B-18B. Mr. Hollands' mother 
pledged to help her son to keep his commitments and offered to let him live with her 
upon condition that he receive drug counseling and obtain his GED or high school 
diploma. Id. at 15B, 20B. 
Mr. Hollands admitted that he knew the car he was using was stolen. R. 53: 3 A. 
In a written statement included in the addendum to the presentence report, he accepted 
responsibility for his criminal behavior and resolved to improve himself: 
"I made a bad choice to be driving the car. I can't change the 
past I can only better my future and not make the wrong 
choices.... I knew it was wrong what I did. I am ready to 
accept full responsibility of my actions. Over the past 18 
months of my encarsiration [sic] I have realized that this is 
not the life I want to leed [sic]. I have a lot more going for 
me out there then [sic] in here [prison]." 
R.53:3A. 
According to the presentence report, Mr. Hollands had been arrested 13 times as a 
juvenile for several minor offenses including possession of tobacco, curfew violations, 
minor theft and traffic violations. R. 53: 7B-9B. The only juvenile conviction involving 
any violence was for an assault with substantial risk of bodily injury for which Mr. 
Hollands received a nonjudicial fine. Id, at 8B. The juvenile courts had never detained 
Mr. Hollands for any of his offenses or even placed him on formal probation. Id. at 13B, 
22B. 
5Mr. Hollands attended high school only through the 11th grade. R. 53: 15B. 
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Mr. Hollands was also arrested several times as an adult, mainly for drug-related 
crimes, theft and traffic offenses. Id. at 9B-12B. Other than his Weber County 
convictions, his only adult convictions were two misdemeanor offenses for carrying a 
concealed weapon and possessing drug paraphernalia for which he received probation. 
Id. at 9B, 13B. All of Mr. Hollands' criminal activities occurred while he was under the 
influence of controlled substances. Id, at 18B. Although the addendum to the 
presentence report does not recommend a particular sentence, the Department of Adult 
Parole and Probation did not disagree with the district attorney's recommendation of 
concurrent sentencing. R. 53: 6A-7A. 
Judge Denise Lindberg sentenced Mr. Hollands on April 1, 1999. R. 52. 
Defense counsel requested Judge Lindberg to follow the district attorney's 
recommendation and to impose any sentence concurrently with Mr. Hollands' one to 15 
year sentence from Weber County. R. 52: 5. As defense counsel noted, even though Mr. 
Hollands' Weber County convictions were his first felonies, he was denied probation and 
was given a lengthy prison term. Id. at 5-6. Defense counsel argued that consecutive 
punishments was not warranted because Mr. Hollands' present offense and the Weber 
County crimes occurred within a three-month period during which he associated with 
drug manufacturers. Id. at 7-8. In addition, Mr. Hollands' incarceration prevented him 
from making support payments to a three-year old child that he fathered. Id, at 6-7. 
Thus, Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs could be best addressed by a reasonable term of 
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imprisonment, drug counseling in prison followed by release rather than a lengthy prison 
term. Id. 
Mr. Hollands informed the court that he was attending substance abuse classes in 
prison and that he was working toward receiving his GED certificate. Id. at 9. He also 
reiterated his determination "to lead my life in the right direction when I get out, be 
responsible and start to be a [productive] member of society." Id. 
The sentencing judge declined to impose concurrent sentences and, instead, 
sentenced Mr. Hollands to a term of zero to five years and ordered the sentence to run 
consecutive to the Weber County sentences. R. 52: 10-11. In making this determination, 
the sentencing judge concluded that Mr. Hollands did not "deserve a break" for starting 
his criminal career "at the top" with a serious drug crime. R. 52: 10. She also 
emphasized Mr. Hollands' numerous criminal arrests and convictions along with the fact 
that Mr. Hollands was given the benefit of pleading down from a second degree to a third 
degree felony. Based on the matrix computed by the Department of Adult Parole and 
Probation, Mr. Hollands must serve a minimum of 30 months imprisonment for his 
present offense. R. 53: Appendix to Addendum to Presentence Report). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In sentencing Mr. Hollands to consecutive terms, the sentencing judge failed to 
consider the ordinary nature of Mr. Hollands' offenses, his arrests for mainly minor, non-
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violent crimes, and the absence of injury to any victims. See U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) 
(Supp. 1999); State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). She also neglected to 
acknowledge that Mr. Hollands confessed to his crimes, repeatedly took responsibility 
for his actions, committed to improve himself and demonstrated that commitment by 
receiving substance abuse counseling and working toward receiving his GED certificate. 
Instead of applying these statutory factors, the sentencing judge overstated the severity of 
Mr. Hollands' drug offense and criminal history. The imposition of consecutive 
sentences bars the Board of Pardons and Parole from releasing Mr. Hollands for at least 
two and-a-half additional years even if the steps Mr. Hollands has already taken toward 
rehabilitation prove genuine. The sentencing judge's failure to apply the relevant 
statutory factors in sentencing Mr. Hollands was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION 
IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES GIVEN THE 
UNREMARKABLE NATURE OF THE OFFENSES. MR. 
HOLLANDS' HISTORY OF MAINLY MINOR. NON-
VIOLENT CRIMES. HIS ACCEPTANCE OF 
RESPONSIBILITY. AND HIS DEMONSTRATED 
COMMITMENT TOWARD REHABILITATION 
In sentencing Mr. Hollands to consecutive sentences, the sentencing judge failed 
to consider the circumstances of the offenses, the minor nature of Mr. Hollands's 
criminal history, his commitment to change, or his rehabilitative needs. Rather, she 
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focused on the number of Mr. Hollands' prior arrests and convictions and paid particular 
attention to the seriousness of his prior drug conviction. Even considering those factors, 
Mr. Hollands crime of attempting to receive a stolen vehicle did not warrant consecutive 
sentencing. 
This court reviews trial judges' sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. State 
v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "An abuse of discretion results 
when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors . . . . ' " State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989)). In determining whether to impose consecutive rather concurrent sentences, 
courts must consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant...." U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 
1999). Courts must remember further that, under Utah law, concurrent sentences are 
favored over consecutive ones. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). 
The "gravity and circumstances of the offenses" do not warrant consecutive 
sentences. U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). Although, admittedly, the drug 
conviction in Weber County was a serious offense, Mr. Hollands received a stiff 15-year 
sentence and was denied probation even though this crime was his first felony 
conviction. In addition, the circumstances of that offense were unremarkable: Mr. 
Hollands served as the procurer of materials for a clandestine lab as a means of 
supporting his drug habit. In apparent agreement that this offense was an ordinary drug 
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lab conviction, the district attorney agreed to let Mr. Hollands plead down from a first 
degree felony to a second degree felony attempt offense. Moreover, the district attorney 
conceded that Mr. Hollands' involvement in the drug lab did not warrant consecutive 
sentences for the drug and weapon convictions. 
This case similarly involved an ordinary crime of possessing a stolen vehicle. 
Like the drug offense, the district attorney conceded that this offense was 
undistinguished and allowed Mr. Hollands to plead down to a third degree felony attempt 
conviction. And, after considering the facts and circumstances of the drug offense and 
the present crime, the district attorney recommended concurrent sentences. 
The sentencing judge failed to appreciate these mitigating circumstances and 
ruled, instead, that Mr. Hollands' did not "deserve a break" for committing a serious drug 
offense as his first felony conviction. R. 52: 10. In ruling that imposing concurrent 
sentences would be a "break" for Mr. Hollands, the judge erroneously appeared to place 
the burden of justifying concurrent sentences on him. Under Utah law, the imposition of 
concurrent sentences is presumed over consecutive ones. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 
938 (Utah 1998). In this case, the ordinary circumstances of the offenses do not defeat 
the presumption of concurrent sentencing. 
Second, the sentencing judge failed to consider the minor nature of Mr. Hollands' 
prior criminal history. U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). Although Mr. Hollands had 
been arrested numerous times as a juvenile, those arrests were for such minor matters as 
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curfew violations, possession of tobacco, minor theft and traffic violations. See State v. 
Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (minor traffic offenses, a prior misdemeanor theft 
conviction and uncharged bail jumping did not support consecutive sentencing). Other 
than a juvenile arrest for an assault with substantial risk of bodily injury, Mr. Hollands 
has no history of violence. R.53: 8. The juvenile courts apparently agreed that Mr. 
Hollands' juvenile offenses were not serious because they declined to detain him or even 
place him on probation. 
Mr. Hollands' only other adult convictions were for misdemeanor possession of a 
weapon and drug paraphernalia. There is no evidence in his history of injury to any 
victims. See Galli. 967 P.2d at 938 (concurrent sentences warranted, in part, because 
defendant did not injure victims or employ violence); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1302 (Utah 1993) (absence of violence in defendant's prior criminal history supported 
concurrent sentences for aggravated sexual assault and kidnaping). Nevertheless, the 
sentencing judge failed to even consider the minor nature of and circumstances 
surrounding the bulk of Mr. Hollands' prior offenses and, instead, she simply tallied the 
number of prior arrests and convictions. 
Third, the sentencing judge further failed to acknowledge Mr. Hollands' 
"character" and, in particular, the significant steps he has taken to confront his drug 
problem. U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). Mr. Hollands confessed to his felony 
offenses in both Weber and Salt Lake Counties and he has repeatedly "accepted] full 
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responsibility [for his] actions." R. 53: 3A. He has also recognized the necessity of 
staying away from those people who influenced him to participate in criminal activity. 
R. 53: 22B. Not only has Mr. Hollands expressed his desire to improve himself, he has 
demonstrated his commitment to change by participating in substance abuse counseling 
and working toward receiving his GED certificate so that, in his words, he can "lead my 
life in the right direction when I get out, be responsible and start to be a [productive] 
member of society." R. 52: 9. 
Rather than crediting Mr. Hollands for accepting responsibility for his criminal 
conduct and taking steps to improve himself, the sentencing judge ruled that concurrent 
sentences were not warranted because Mr. Hollands had already been granted leniency 
by being allowed to plead down to a third degree felony. R. 52: 10. In determining 
whether to impose concurrent versus consecutive sentences, Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999) requires judges to consider only the "gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant...." If anything, plea agreements support imposing concurrent sentencing: 
the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that concurrent sentences are appropriate when, as 
here, the defendant pleads guilty and has "voluntarily confessedf,] admitted responsibility 
for the crimes he committed . . . [and] expressed a commitment and hope to improve 
himself." State v. Gallu 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). Under the sentencing judge's 
view, criminal defendants are actually discouraged from pleading guilty and accepting 
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responsibility for their criminal conduct. 
Finally, and most importantly, the sentencing judge completely ignored Mr. 
Hollands' substantial "rehabilitative needs." U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). The 
root of Mr. Hollands' prior criminal behavior is his drug habit. In particular, Mr. 
Hollands' felony convictions involved a period of three months during which he 
associated with people who manufactured drugs.6 Nevertheless, the sentencing judge 
never considered addressing Mr. Hollands' drug addiction but instead was determined to 
punish Mr. Hollands for his numerous arrests and convictions. 
Had the sentencing judge evaluated Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs, she would 
have realized that 30 months of additional prison time was not warranted. At the time of 
sentencing, Mr. Hollands had repeatedly stated his commitment to quit drugs and to 
become a productive member of society. He demonstrated his commitment to change by 
enrolling in substance abuse counseling and working toward his GED certificate. In 
addition, his mother supports him in his goals and he has a three-year old child who he 
plans to support when he is released. Nevertheless, even if Mr. Hollands resolves his 
drug habit while in prison and he develops the skills necessary to be a productive citizen, 
the imposition of consecutive sentences prevents the Board of Pardons and Parole ("the 
Board") from releasing him for two and-a-half years after he completes his one-to-15-
6Both of Mr. Hollands' felony convictions involved a person or persons named 
McCarty or McCarti. 
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year sentence from Weber County. 
Given Mr. Hollands' acceptance of responsibility and the steps he has already 
taken to improve himself, his rehabilitative needs can best be met by allowing the Board 
"the flexibility to adjust [his] prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and 
preparation to return to society." State v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1993). As 
the Utah Supreme Court has observed, "The Board is in a far better position than a court 
to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation 
while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." State v. Smith, 909 
P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995). 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (1998), is in 
agreement. After pleading guilty in three separate cases to aggravated robbery before 
three different judges, Galli was sentenced to consecutive sentences. Id. at 932-33. The 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that, in ordering the sentences to run consecutively, the trial 
judges failed to consider Galli's lack of serious prior offenses, the absence of harm to 
any victims and the limited use of force used in the robberies. Id. Galli had also 
confessed to the crimes, accepted responsibility for his conduct and expressed a 
commitment to improve himself. And, although Galli had absconded and was out of the 
state for three years, his was law-abiding throughout that period and had demonstrated 
his potential for rehabilitation. Id. The Court concluded that "[t]he imposition of 
concurrent rather than consecutive sentences better serves Galli's rehabilitative needs by 
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allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he 
has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id. 
Mr. Hollands, similarly, has a history of minor offenses and he has no record of 
any significant violence or injury to any victims. Like Galli, he has accepted 
responsibility for his crimes and has demonstrated his commitment to rehabilitation by 
admitting his drug problem, receiving drug counseling and working toward his GED 
certificate. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hollands' Weber County 
convictions for a second degree felony drug charge and a third degree felony weapon 
offense together with his present conviction for a third degree felony appear to be no 
more serious than Mr. Galli's three first degree felony convictions for aggravated 
robbery. Affording Mr. Hollands the possibility of earlier release and parole supervision 
is especially appropriate because he has never had the opportunity of probation for a 
felony conviction. Instead, the imposition of consecutive sentences denies the Board of 
flexibility to release Mr. Hollands for 30 months even should he demonstrate "genuine 
progress toward rehabilitation." Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Isaac J. Hollands requests that this Court remand this matter to the trial 
court and to order the trial judge to resentence him to a concurrent term of zero to five 
years. 
SUBMITTED, this j£fc day of August, 1999. 
^-fyp 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID P.S. MACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, KENT R. HART, certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of this 
biref to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854, this /£* day of August, 1999. 
KENT R. HART 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of August, 1999. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Page 4 
1j them it looks like 3/26/76 is the correct day. 
It's correct in one place, incorrect in — 
THE COURT: Okay. I notice on the 
front of the presentence is incorrect. Okay, 
I'll — 
MS. DENHARDT: I have one additional 
concern and that is the matrix. It's scoring him 
on the matrix and I think sometimes the presentence 
people misunderstand what the entry is where they 
list — they give four points for supervision 
history, current supervision of pretrial release. 
I think sometimes they score them at four if 
they're currently under supervision, but I don't 
think that that was intended because I don't think 
there's anything wrong with being under pretrial 
supervision. It's whether they have previously 
absconded from or (Inaudible) pretrial use of 
supervision. And from what I can tell in here, 
that didn't happen. 
I think that he should score zero on 
that and not a four, which would substantially 
change his ranking and put him in the good rather 
than the moderate category on the matrix. So 
that's a pretty significant one and I've seen this 
happen before. But in looking at three being a 
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1! prior revocation, I don't see how simply being on 
2| pretrial release would be a worse thing than that. 
j 
3 So that would be our position on that. We would 
maintain that that should be a zero because he's 
never had probation of any kind. He's never been 
on probation (Inaudible). That's the only other 
correction. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other 
information that you believe needs to be raised? 
MS. DENHARDT: Yes, that we were asking 
you to impose a sentence confirming the 1/15 
sentence given to him by Judge Lyon. Now, there 
are two reasons for that, the first one being the 
fact that Judge Lyon committed Mr. Hollands to 
prison when he had no prior probation history and 
that's kind of a rare thing that that would happen. 
Now, he did that because of the nature of the 
offense and the concern that we have in this 
community currently with the clandestined lab 
problem. And so I can't say that his doing that 
was unjustified, I mean I see why he would do that. 
But my point is, is that he was treated harshly 
because of the nature of the offense already by not 
being given any opportunity at probation. 
This is a young man who has virtually 
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no jail experience before this and now he's finding 
himself in prison. It's substantially different 
than someone who has repeat, you know, jail 
sentencing in and out. He's also had no history of 
probation, he's had no opportunity to get 
treatment. He has a serious drug problem, he 
admits to that. His reason for doing the 
clandestined lab was primarily for use, to support 
his own use. 
He does have a drug problem. He has 
not had the benefit of drug counseling. He will 
seek that, he will take advantage of what exists in 
the prison to try to better himself that way. But 
my point is that his history is such that he's 
suffering the (Inaudible) consequences for his 
involvement here is (Inaudible) him. 
He is subject to child support as well 
for a child that he currently has. He's already 
not been in a position to make child support 
payments for long periods of time due to the 
incarceration. I'm concerned about extending that 
further at this point. 
Again, he is suffering a punishment, 
he's suffering a severe punishment and I'm 
concerned about him being able to get out at some 
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1j point here and (Inaudible). If he could get 
2, himself straight, he (Inaudible) history is such 
that he's gotten (Inaudible) with this and I 
;(Inaudible) he'll meet those child support 
obligations. 
Now, that combined with his lack of 
having had any opportunity for probation, his age, 
yes, he's had his (Inaudible) so some of his first 
exposure to the results of it now. He did it right 
when he did it. He certainly, you know, came in 
with a bang here, but he's being punished for that. 
He's suffering the consequences and he can be held 
for a substantial period of time. I hope he'll 
take advantage of what he can through therapy and 
(Inaudible) prison environment. He's resolved 
himself to (Inaudible) his situation. He's looking 
to the future, he's looking at what he can do from 
here . 
So I would ask you to consider running 
these offenses concurrently. They were in a very 
short proximity timewise. I think that what 
happened was while he was litigating his 
clandestined lab case he (Inaudible) well. His 
prior history of offenses were related to when he 
was picked up on this case. So those misdemeanor 
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1j offenses related to the same, the driving without a 
i 
license and all that. So we would ask you to run 
this sentence concurrently with the sentence he's 
(Currently serving out. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: We have nothing. 
7; MS. DENHARDT: Oh, incidentally, 
I 
there's one thing I forgot to mention. With 
respect to the restitution amount, Mr. Hollands 
claims that this accident was not his fault, it was 
the other party's fault. Given that situation, he 
may not be responsible for restitution. He may or 
may not. I mean, clearly, if he's got possession 
of a stolen vehicle at the time, there may be some 
causal connection there. But if the accident is 
not his fault, there's a question legally as to 
whether he's liable for that. 
What I would suggest, and Mr. Mack has 
a longer history with this case than I do, I would 
suggest a general restitution hearing to allow Mr. 
Mack to come in with the benefit of the history of 
this case and argue that legal issue. I don't 
think it will be an argument of the amount as much 
as just a legal issue as to whether (Inaudible) 
that was being qualified under the restitution 
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status. If it is, (Inaudible) okay. 
THE COURT: And the prosecution's 
position on that? 
MR. JOHNSON: I think that might be 
appropriate, Judge. I'm looking through the report 
of Mr. (Inaudible) and I just really can't 
determine anything as to whose fault it was. But 
Ms. Denhardt's position (Inaudible). I mean there's 
no doubt there was a fleeing after the accident but 
I'm not sure what the accident itself shows. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hollands, 
is there anything you would like to make me aware 
of, any statement that you wish to make? 
MR. HOLLAND: Well, I've been attending 
a substance abuse class at the prison. I've also 
been working on my GED (Inaudible). I'm ready to 
lead my life in the right direction when I get out, 
be responsible and start to be a member of society. 
(Inaudible ) . 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there any reason 
we should not proceed with sentencing? 
MS. DENHARDT: I don't think so, Judge, 
as long as we (Inaudible) restitution. 
THE COURT: Okay. I concur on the 
restitution matter and we will set that for a 
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restitution hearing. 
Mr. Hollands, I have reviewed the 
presentence report and although I have listened to 
your counsel's position in terms of your 
background, it's not quite as lily white as would 
appear. I mean you had 13 juvenile referrals. And 
as counsel has indicated, when you became --
entered the adult system, you did in fact enter it 
with a bang. I remind you that this amended down 
to a third degree. You've had other second degrees 
and third degree felonies. Even granting, and I'm 
not sure that I necessarily agree with Ms. 
Denhardt, but even assuming the criminal history 
assessment argument that you have made, I think 
there is something to be said for the fact that not 
having been given the prior opportunity of 
probation, given this history and given the nature 
of the offenses that you've committed, I'm not sure 
that I disagree at all with the action of the Court 
in this matter. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, people 
that choose a criminal path sometimes work their 
way up. You just started at the top, and I'm not 
sure that you deserve a break for that. 
Accordingly, I — despite your counsel's eloquent 
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1, plea, I hereby sentence you to an indeterminate j 
2| term of zero to five years at the state prison. I 
am going to recommend to the Board of Prisons that 
,t h i s sentence be served consecutive. 
I am scheduling a restitution hearing 
on the amount that is to be entered as a result of 
the damage that was caused by you. Okay? I am 
also going to enter a $200 recoupment for the 
services of your attorney in this matter. I'm not 
quite sure how that restitution — that recoupment 
is going to be paid but I will let adult probation 
-- I mean let the parole board and parole officers 
worry about that at the time. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible), how 
long do you think? 
MR. JOHNSON: What are we looking at? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: June. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's good. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: Actually, it depends on 
when in June. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: June 22nd. 
MR. JOHNSON: That might not work. I'm 
going to be out of town (Inaudible). 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: July? 
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